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goal of the book to provide a clear explanation of the “hard cases” and to improve 
the communication between regulators and engineers (201).
Regulating Code leaves one wondering about a larger discussion surrounding how 
to assess goals and outcomes when governing technology. For Brown and Marsden, 
each hard case is assessed based on criteria aimed at public policy or government 
regulation rather than on how the technological system works. The authors take 
for granted that a discussion about the utility of public policy is a valid substitute 
for an assessment of the Internet technology, and that the criteria for assessing the 
outcome is transparency, enforcement, interoperability, and efficiency. This need 
not be the case. For example, in the analysis of censorship, the authors acknowledge 
that the outcome assessment of the Internet was initially centered on an ability to 
survive a thermonuclear war (93). Obviously, that criterion for success is not cur-
rently being used, but the example does beg the question: what does “working” 
mean in these instances?
Brown and Marsden’s nuanced and balanced analysis of recent hard cases of 
Internet technologies should provide guidance on how to assess more recent ex-
amples in privacy (e.g., big data and law enforcement requests), copyright (e.g., 
Megaupload), censorship (Bitcoin), social networking services (SilkRoad), and Net 
Neutrality. For someone interested in public policy and regulation of Internet tech-
nologies, Regulating Code provides a thorough approach to assessing governance 
from the point of view of the public good.
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Mathias Risse’s work is what it promises to be: an engaging reflection on global justice and its centuries old history of thought. It culminates in a conception 
of global justice—Risse calls it pluralist internationalism—which is both thoughtful 
and, at least in its basic tenets, plausible. Risse’s book is no easy read. His reflections 
are dense and often complicated. The difficult structure and sub-structure of his ar-
gument does not excuse one’s mind to wander; thus, prepare for frequent rereading. 
In short, the book requires a considerable amount of focus, time and commitment 
of its readers, but it is worth the investment.
https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.5840/beq201424421
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 15:42:11, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
628 Business Ethics Quarterly
The aim of Risse’s “realistic utopia” (233) is to overcome the antagonism be-
tween those who hold that justice applies only to the domestic context of the state 
and those who hold that the view on the state as the proper locus of justice is anti-
quated. Risse believes that the two views can be reconciled: defending “a special 
place” for the state, in Risse’s view, does not exclude a perspective on global justice. 
Reconciling a domestic with a global perspective on justice is, by any means, not 
a novel undertaking within the global justice debate; rather, what is notable about 
Risse’s approach is its proposed pluralism regarding grounds of justice (hence, the 
name of his theory). Risse’s pluralist internationalism is characterized by three es-
sential insights: first, shared membership in the state provides the grounds for strong 
egalitarian principles of justice with a domestic scope; second, the conditions which 
establish the normative peculiarity of the state apply, to a lesser extent, globally, 
giving rise to weaker principles of justice with a global scope; third, such relational 
grounds for global principles can be complemented with non-relational grounds, 
which similarly lead to principles of justice of global scope. Risse elaborates on 
two such grounds in depth: our common humanity and, more instructively, our col-
lective ownership of the earth.
The first three parts of the book explore the various grounds of justice and, based 
on it, develop a contingent theory of human rights. Part one deals with shared member-
ship in the state as a ground of justice. This leads to demanding egalitarian principles 
along the lines of Rawls’s Theory of Justice. Additionally, it delves into non-relational 
grounds of justice, which eventually lead to weaker global principles. For that purpose 
it rebuts both ideal-typical accounts of statism and of globalism and explores what 
follows from our common humanity for the development of principles of global 
justice. Risse then outlines a conception of human rights based on such grounds.
Part two engages further with non-relational grounds of justice. Specifically, it 
develops what can be seen as the center pillar of the book, which is its account of 
common ownership of the earth. The “pivotal result” of this part of the book is the 
principle of justice that is associated with such common ownership: “The distribu-
tion of original resources and spaces of the earth among the global population is just 
only if everyone has the opportunity to use them to satisfy her or his basic needs, 
or otherwise lives under a property arrangement that provides the opportunity to 
satisfy basic needs” (124). Derivative of this principle, Risse proposes a second 
conception of human rights in chapter 7. The two theories of human rights, based 
on our common humanity and on common ownership of the earth respectively, are 
integrated in chapter 11, resulting in a contingent conception of human rights as 
membership rights in the global order. Part two concludes with an exploration of 
common ownership in regard to three distinct domains: duties of states toward im-
migrants (chapter 8), duties to future generations (chapter 9) and duties resulting 
from climate change (chapter 10).
Part three of the book deals with international structures as a third set of grounds 
for global justice; specifically, it explores our shared membership in the global order 
and our shared subjection to the global trading system. The specific conception of 
human rights which is developed and finalized in this part of the book (chapter 11) 
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is then reflected specifically as it relates to essential pharmaceuticals (chapter 12) 
and to labor rights (chapter 13).
Part four of the book explores the justification and desirability of the state sys-
tem as an essential condition for the plausibility of Risse’s conception of pluralist 
internationalism. Furthermore, it assesses obligations deriving from pluralist inter-
nationalism for states and for global institutions, specifically the WTO.
Risse’s book does not explicitly connect to the core debates in business eth-
ics and corporate responsibility, if only for the fact that the role of business and 
corporations are not directly addressed. However, due to its breadth, it offers valu-
able context and ample connecting points from which to reflect on our field. The 
chapters on pharmaceuticals, on labor rights, and particularly the two chapters on 
the justice of international trade (chapter 14) and on the obligations of the World 
Trade Organization (chapter 18) frequently cross over into our domain of expertise 
and contain valuable practical implications for anyone interested in the workings 
and governance of the global economic system.
By far the most original, engaging and indeed the most convincing part of the 
book is Risse’s revitalization of Grotius’s ideas on common ownership of the earth. 
Grotius influences Risse’s arguments to a greater extent than even Rawls does (91) 
and it is from this part of Risse’s analysis that the reader gains insights which are not 
readily available in other works on global justice. However, as illuminating as his 
elaborations on common ownership are, Risse’s theory of human rights that derives 
from it does not fully convince the reader. Risse conceptualizes human rights as 
membership rights in the global order. By membership rights he means rights vis-
à-vis that global order, which inevitably influences the life prospects of all human 
beings. Thus, from the point of view of common ownership, human rights are those 
rights that protect the status of human beings as co-owners and thus their ability to 
meet basic needs within that global order. His theory of human rights is thus contin-
gent, because it depends on the existence and actual form of the global order. One 
may ask whether it is really human rights that are at stake here or not rather global 
citizenship rights or something similar. Risse depicts them as human rights because, 
as he states with Quincy Wright, “human rights are rights which are alike for all 
human beings” (141). From the point of view of such a rather superficial definition 
of human rights, which refers merely to the “scope of application” rather than to the 
“source of validity,” such rights may indeed qualify; if we presuppose a somewhat 
more substantive definition, however, such a theory may not take us very far.
Not surprisingly, the set of human rights derived from common ownership is 
exceedingly thin. There is no claim for an adequate standard of health, no claim 
for basic education beyond what is economically useful, and no claim for decent 
treatment in the workplace. Not even the permissibility of slavery can be ruled out 
entirely by this approach (143–44). In order to fill the evident gaps that this concep-
tion of human rights leaves, Risse extends his conception to include human rights 
rooted in our common humanity. He can do so based on the expressed pluralism of 
his theory and, I believe, he must do so in order to render his theory morally accept-
able. However, by turning common humanity and common ownership as a source 
for human rights contingent on the global order, he seems at least implicitly to send 
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non-relationalism on its way out the back door of his approach. We may not notice 
it in practice because a global order is already in place and it affects us all. Thus, 
losing such membership rights is a rather theoretical scenario; but Conceptually, 
Risse’s contingent theory of human rights seems to undermine the very pluralism 
it is built upon.
Risse’s pluralist conception may have intuitive appeal because it offers a little 
something for everyone—statists, globalists, internationalists, relationalists and non-
relationalists alike will find their views taken seriously. It also accommodates the 
reality in which we live today; it is a reality which is dominated by the experience 
of living in a state and of being globally interconnected. Both aspects are relevant 
for our social lives and personal identities and therefore have some normative 
implications for our responsibilities to fellow human beings. However, the mere 
fact of living in a state system does not, of course, provide sufficient justification 
for why such a system should be in place to begin with. Thus, the plausibility of 
Risse’s internationalism hinges on whether or not we accept his justification of state 
boundaries. Risse addresses this question in chapters 15 and 16. His conclusion is 
that the state system is justified not only pragmatically, but also morally, although 
only in a “moderate sense.” What he means by that, in a nutshell, is that the state 
system should not be abolished now nor should we aspire to do so, because we lack 
a better alternative despite “nagging doubts” about its general desirability. This is 
a sensible position to take, but it also raises questions: is it sufficient for the state 
system to be morally justified merely in a “moderate sense” in order to give rise 
to something so fundamental as special obligations of justice to compatriots? Or 
can the justification for the separation between strong domestic and weak global 
principles of justice itself be rooted in anything less than considerations of justice? 
I am not sure about the answers to these questions, but doubts remain.
What is ingenious about Risse’s book is that it is both general enough to provide 
a solid overview and introduction for those little familiar with the global justice 
debate and sufficiently specific that those who know the debate well will find the 
position he outlines interesting and engaging. What is missing, perhaps, is passion, 
a spark, the magic of following him somewhere we have not been before. Risse’s 
position is interesting, but it is not exciting. It is well grounded and well embed-
ded in the debate, but it rarely transcends it. It shines a light on every corner of 
the global justice debate and be sure that every time you think you caught a gap in 
his theory, he will address it a couple of pages later. Thus, Risse’s theory is highly 
sophisticated and painstakingly rich on detail, but it somehow lacks a grand vision. 
By all means, it is a book that ought to be on the shelf of anyone concerned with 
questions of global justice, but for my part, it will not be among those truly inspiring 
books I keep revisiting because I cannot get enough of them.
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